Options Moving Forward
If ceding time has served al-Qaeda far more
productively than it has Pakistan, then the practice of extremely limited
engagement or even disengagement of al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies must end.
A combination of efforts and resultant action must be carefully considered to
avoid the regressive nature of the status quo and at least – for the time being
– ensure al-Qaeda must invest resources committed to defensive operations inside
their Pakistani global headquarters and safe havens.
Our options are neither
unlimited nor are they as limited as some would have us believe. A weakened and
withdrawing Musharraf serves neither his interests nor the better interests of
the Pakistani people. Before addressing the options we have, we must recognize
the imperative of Pakistani engagement, encourage President Musharraf to press
the enemy, despite setbacks, and again extend the offer of support in forms our
military and intelligence services are most adept at providing.
Option2 – Engage Tribal Leaders While Wielding The Stick
Likewise we should encourage,
despite its unlikely success, attempts at reversing the internal tribal support
that al-Qaeda and the Taliban receive from the inhabitants of the affected
regions. We may envision an Anbar-like turn against al-Qaeda though it is far
from the likely consequence.
Instead, our efforts should be aimed at
assuring the tribal authorities of the FATA regions and beyond that so long as
al-Qaeda and the Taliban are present, these regions and their people will have
no peace, no safety and no autonomy. Should they aid Pakistan in the elimination
of the enemy, they will in return receive the autonomy they value so greatly,
along with assurances of economic and military support should they require it.
Reaching out to them will be neither simple nor straightforward, as the
overwhelming majority have already made alliances with the enemy we are
combating. Yet if assured – and demonstrated - that their people are not safe
and they will not be free from outside attack with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
their midst, it remains at least possible that Pakistan may woo them into a
reversal of allegiances.
Option – More Pressure/Assistance to Musharraf on
Acting
By encouraging and, to a degree, enabling Musharraf to confront the
enemy while attempting to usurp the enemies internal protectors, we effectively
begin the process of retaking the role of the aggressor in the battle against
al-Qaeda. This is not without risk and high costs for the Pakistani military and
the civilian population of the FATA regions. Yet the cost is much lower than the
that which would result from stasis or an acceptance of a status quo that, as
has already been demonstrated, only strengthens the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization.
Musharraf’s reluctance to date has hinged on many factors.
However, they have all borne characteristics which have led Musharraf and others
inside Pakistan to believe that relative inaction – inasmuch as is possible – is
less costly at current than action. This perception must change and the stasis
of al-Qaeda’s condition within the regions of the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas seen for what it is – a period of time to build the greater threat more
capable of seizing Pakistan and attacking US and Western targets.
To its
credit, the Administration has pursued a course of both carrots and sticks with
Pervez Musharraf, usually only permitting the carrots public release. This has
been a wise approach and relatively effective approach. However, the current
calculus determining the mix of carrots and sticks – public or private – must be
revisited and recalculated. A new formulation is required in order to further
compel the Pakistani president to aggressively press al-Qaeda and the Taliban
within his own borders.
Option – The “Dirty War” Approach
One avenue that
can and should be better developed is something that has been termed as a “Dirty
War” approach. Requiring more than just “pinprick strikes” inside Pakistan,
Daveed Gartestein-Ross writes
that “[w]e need to better understand the patronage networks that al-Qaeda
and the Taliban benefit from, and undermine them.” ‘Undermine’ is a sanitized
manner of describing disruption that includes covert penetration and targeting
key players and facilitators for arrest when possible and killing when
necessary.
In his analysis, Gartenstein-Ross quoted a senior military
intelligence officer who said, “What I think we should do in Pakistan is a
parallel version of what Iran has run against us in Iraq: giving money,
empowering actors. Some of this will involve working with some shady characters,
but the alternative–sending U.S. forces into Pakistan for a sustained bombing
campaign–is worse.” To be sure, a large-scale stand-alone bombing campaign
against an enemy deeply embedded within the civilian population would directly
undercut any gains possibly made through concurrently engaging tribal leaders.
While as a standalone strategy the “Dirty War” option is not enough, it is
absolutely essential and a potential force multiplier if successfully
engaged.
Option – Increased Direct/Indirect US Military Intervention
US military planners may conceive of options including significant air and special
operations enabled direct US attacks on the enemy encampments, or in similar
efforts in support of the Pakistani military once engaged with al-Qaeda forces.
They may also conceive a large scale counterinsurgency force deployment into the
FATA and NWFP. There remain also many degrees of engagement between the two that
may also be considered.
The political will of the American public is
unlikely to support a large scale engagement, as the costs of what would be seen
as a third conflict zone on a military perceived as already stretched too thin
by many is too high. It wouldn’t be a matter of whether the US military could
accomplish the objective of eradicating the enemy in these areas as much as it
would be a question of whether or not the political and military leadership
could or would effectively communicate the value of such an operation - despite
its almost assured high costs.
What is certain is that the US must, either
directly or through current or new allies, engage the al-Qaeda enemy inside
Pakistan. We are much more effective and secure as a nation when our will
determines the time, place and nature of combat than when holding course while
the enemy builds, plots and attacks. No matter the scale of our engagement, the
US must find a course which replaces al-Qaeda’s confidence in their security
with concern for the protection of their assets, personnel and leaders. Their
concerns must be those of survival as they are now in Iraq. We must engage and
challenge the local populations to rebut the ideological views of al-Qaeda,
while simultaneous permitting them to maintain or increase their independence,
religious and cultural footing and their opportunities for economic
growth.
Non-Negotiable Requirement - Action
No single option above solves
the ominous riddle of Pakistan, but rather some measure of combination. But
whatever combination proves the winning calculus – including the possibility of
other options not articulated here - the ultimate answer to defeating al-Qaeda
within Pakistan is action. Be it through Pakistani forces, US and Coalition
forces and/or that of as yet undeveloped allies, we must take decisive and
aggressive steps to defeat the enemy within Pakistan’s tribal regions. Our
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq should serve as guides, and with appropriate
adaption, we should retake the initiative and begin the hunt anew.
While
much of the news coverage of our operations this year in Iraq has focused on the
’surge’ with respect to the number of troops in country - the real story is the
surge in initiative and focus. We have sought the enemy, displaced him from his
encampments, constrained his avenues of egress and engaged him at the time and
place of our selection – now, wherever he is. Through regaining the initiative –
taking decisive action – al-Qaeda in Iraq has been damaged to the point that
some are even calling for a declaration of victory of sorts over them. While
this is premature, the conditions that make it even fathomable are the result of
action.
We must employ an adaptation of these tactics, combined with the
patience to win over the local population’s support and the continued extension
of our support for President Musharraf and his efforts to manage his political
and military opposition. This will certainly result in a higher likelihood of
success than watching the hours pass as al-Qaeda strengthens and reacquires its
targets here and elsewhere.
Regardless of which option – or variations
thereof – becomes the chosen course, it is abundantly clear that the only
unacceptable option toward defeating al-Qaeda in its Pakistani global
headquarters is the maintenance of the status quo. For the status quo is a
strengthening al-Qaeda, and that nets us farther from victory, greater security
and the defeat of al-Qaeda, not closer.
